MAJOR COURT DECISIONS OF

The following is a compendium of major communications law decisions handed down by courts
of the United States from January through September 1997.
American Civil Liberties Union of
Georgia v. Miller
F.Supp. - (D.C. N.Ga. 1997)
Issue:
Whether plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a
Georgia law which criminalizes the knowing computer transmission of data if such data uses an individual name to falsely identify the sender, or the
data uses a logo, registered trademark, trade
name, copyrighted symbol, or seal which falsely
implies the sender is authorized to use of the
aforementioned data.
Holding:
The plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction because they have shown: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) a
substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) the plaintiffs' hardship in not obtaining an injunction outweighs the
defendant's hardship in being enjoined; and (4)
an injunction will advance the public interest.

1997
"use," and "falsely imply." Second, the statute is
subject to arbitrary enforcement because it fails to
notify law enforcement officers of the prohibited
conduct. Third, the statute hampers free expression by causing the plaintiffs to engage in self-censorship to avoid prosecution.
The court held that the plaintiffs' self-censorship equates to a loss of First Amendment freedoms, which is an irreparable injury. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs meet the second requirement for a.
preliminary injunction.
In balancing the hardships, the court continued to focus on the plaintiffs' irreparable injury of
self-censorship. The plaintiffs' loss of First
Amendment freedoms far outweighed the state's
burden in being enjoined from enforcing the statute because existing Georgia law already protected against fraud.
Lastly, the court found that a preliminary injunction would further the publics' interest in access to protected speech. The plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction was granted.
AT&T Corp. v. FCC
113 F.3d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether the FCC provided a reasoned explanation for modifying its regulation scheme requiring information in the form of billing names and
addresses ("BNA").

Discussion:
The plaintiffs will most likely prevail on the
merits by showing that the Georgia statute is a
content-based restriction which will not pass the
court's strict scrutiny test. Although the defendants assert that fraud prevention is the statute's
purpose, and fraud prevention is a compelling
state interest, the subject law is too broad to
achieve this end. It applies to non-fraudulent
false identifications and therefore is not narrowly
tailored to target fraud.
Additionally, the plaintiffs are likely to demonstrate that the statute is void for vagueness for
three reasons. First, the statute does not provide
adequate notice of its proscribed conduct because
it does not define terms such as "falsely identify,"

Holding:
The court held that the FCC met a requisite
level of reasonable explanation and denied the
petition.
Discussion:
The court found that the FCC had engaged in
an ongoing rulemaking proceeding over a period
of several months, issuing three orders on reconsideration on the BNA procedure. After each order, AT&T responded with a request for reconsideration, followed by another order, until the FCC
issued its Third Order on Reconsideration.
The Third Order on Reconsiderationspecified that
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BNA information was not to be used for marketing purposes as that would destroy the privacy
considerations contained in the Second Order. Further, the court found that AT&T did not provide
any support for its view that in an ongoing
rulemaking the agency must restate its previously
expressed rationale in each subsequent order.
The court found that the ongoing rulemaking
proceeding was continuing and therefore, the
Third Orderwas a logical outgrowth of the first two
wherein the agency gave a reasoned explanation
for its decision that was supported by the record.
Bartholdi Cable Company, Inc. v. FCC
114 F.3d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether the FCC was arbitrary and capricious
in denying Bartholdi Cable Company's ("Bartholdi") request that material it submitted to the
FCC (including, inter alia, customer information,
personnel data, and a list of Bartholdi's unauthorized operations) remain confidential under exemptions 4 and 6 of the Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA").
Holding:
The FCC's action did not reflect a clear error in
judgment, therefore, its decision was not arbitrary
and capricious. Bartholdi's petition for review is
denied.
Discussion:
As part of an FCC investigation into Bartholdi
Cable Company's inadvertent use of operational
fixed microwave service ("OFS") paths without a
license, Bartholdi submitted a report prepared by
Bartholdi's outside counsel, as well as detailed
documentation of unauthorized operations,
dates, and subscribers. Bartholdi requested the
submitted information remain confidential under
exemptions 4 and 6 of FOIA however, the FCC
ordered Bartholdi to disclose the submitted
materials to the public.
Under exemption 4 to the FOIA, agencies have
discretion to disclose privileged or confidential,
commercial or financial information. The FCC,
however, is authorized to disclose exempt material when policy considerations favoring disclosure outweigh the factors favoring non-disclosure.
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The court found that the FCC was not arbitrary or
capricious in requiring disclosure because much
of the subject material was already publicly available. Also, the public has an interest in the data
as it is relevant to Bartholdi's fitness as a licensee.
Further, exemption 6 of the FOJA authorizes
the Government to deny public disclosure of files
such as medical or personnel records, which, if
disclosed, would be an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. As with exemption 4, the decision to disclose the information requires the FCC
to balance the public's interest in disclosure
against the privacy interest in non-disclosure. The
court rejected Bartholdi's contention that the
Commission was arbitrary and capricious in balancing these interests. The FCC properly determined that the privacy interests were minor, because the responsible individuals were already
named in other public documents, and such privacy interests were outweighed by the public's interest in understanding who is receiving FCC
licenses.
The Commission's rejection of Bartholdi's attorney-client and work-product privilege claims
was not arbitrary and capricious because Bartholdi did not provide sufficient facts to establish
the privileges. The Commission itself must be
provided an opportunity to pass on the issues and
this requirement is not satisfied when issues are
only raised to an FCC Bureau or included in an
attachment to or a footnote in an application for
review.
City of Dallas, Texas v. FCC
118 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether the statutory definition of "gross revenue," under 47 U.S.C. § 542(b), includes a cable
operator's fees collected from subscribers that are
specifically allocated to pay a franchise fee.
Holding:
A cable operator's "gross revenue" includes all
revenues, without deduction for subscribers' fees
allocated to pay a franchise fee.
Discussion:
The cities of Dallas and Laredo appealed an
FCC Memorandum Opinion and Order which upheld
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the decision of the FCC's Cable Services Bureau
to deduct subscriber paid franchise fees from the
Cable Act's definition of "gross revenue." States
and municipalities may charge television cable
companies a franchise fee for the right to provide
services within their borders. Federal law, however, limits these fees to "no more than five percent of a cable operator's 'gross revenue.'
Cable companies frequently divide their subscriber's bill statements so that franchise fees are
distinct from the regular cable service charges.
Thus, in a jurisdiction that mandated a 5 percent
franchise fee, a bill for ten dollars worth of cable
service charges would include a one dollar charge
labeled "franchise fee." The cable company and
the FCC believe that the gross revenue of this
company should be ten dollars, while the city asserts that the entire gross revenue is actually
eleven dollars.
The FCC interpretation of a statute must prevail unless it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute or an unreasonable construction
of an ambiguous statute. The statute defines
"gross revenue" as income "derived .

..

from the

operation of the cable system." The court applied
the "standard tools of statutory construction" as
articulated in Chevron USA v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to determine if
that statute was ambiguous. After considering dictionaries, accounting standards, and industry
practice, the court determined that the definition
unambiguously included the franchise fee as part
of "gross revenue" and could not find any legislative history to the contrary.
Competitive Telecommunications Ass'n v.
FCC
117 F.3d 1068 ( 8 th Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether (1) an obligation exists for an incumbent local exchange carrier ("LEC") to provide
"interconnection" to a LEC network was reasonably interpreted to require only physical linking
to the network and (2) an interim decision was
reasonable which allowed incumbent LECs to
temporarily recover some carrier common line
charges and transport interconnection charges
from interconnecting carriers.

Holding:
The court found that limiting interconnection
to physical linkage was based on a proper reading
of the statute taken in its whole context.
Discussion:
Petitioner argued that Congressional intent regarding the issue of interconnection exceeded
mere physical access and should include transmission and routing services. The court looked to the
whole context of the section at issue and concluded that a LEC's duties, by its own terms (providing interconnection for the facilities and
equipment of the requesting carrier with the
LEC's network), was a physical link.
As a result of this conclusion, the court rejected
the petitioner's argument. The court further
noted that the FCC's interpretation of interconnection as being only physical link for the mutual
exchange of traffic between LECs does not violate
the Act.
On the second issue, the petitioner challenged
an interim decision regarding pricing. In its First
Report and Order, the FCC established "a temporary transitional mechanism to help complete all
of the steps toward the pro-competitive goal of
the 1996 Act." Petitioner saw the FCC's action as
arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
The FCC acknowledged the inadequacy of
resolving all conflicts that may have arisen as a result of the Act but pled with the court that because of conflicting deadlines imposed by Congress, this was the best means by which to achieve
the long term goals of the Act. While the court
indicated that the FCC's approach was not the
most effective method of obtaining and maintaining universal service on a transitional basis, it did
not find the FCC's interim action to be arbitrary
and capricious.
COMSAT Corp. v. FCC
114 F.3d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether the FCC has the authority to amend
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their regulatory fee schedule in order to charge a
signatory fee to satellite based common carriers.
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Holding:

The FCC acted outside its authority in charging
a common carrier a signatory fee.

The court granted the motion for preliminary
injunctions against the defendants for copyright
infringement and false advertising, but denied the
ex parte application for an order to so cause re
contempt.

Discussion:

Discussion:

The FCC has the express authority to assess and
collect both application fees, not at issue, and regulatory fees. In assessing and collecting regulatory fees the FCC may "recover the costs
of... enforcement activities, policy and rulemaking activities, user information services, and international activities." 47 U.S.C. Section 159(a)(1).
Congressional intent in the initial regulatory fee
schedule did not include a signatory fee and
therefore, when the FCC attempted to create such
a fee they were met with the implications of the
entire statute which provides in relevant part,
"[i]n making such amendments, the Commission
shall add, delete, or reclassify services in the
Schedule to reflect additions, deletions, or
changes in the nature of its services as a consequence of Commission rulemaking proceedings
or changes in law." 47 U.S.C. Section 159(b) (3).
At oral argument, the Commission conceded
that the signatory fee was not imposed in response to any such "rulemaking proceeding[ ] or
change [ ] in law." 47 U.S.C. Section 159(b)(3).
The court held that the FCC acted outside the
scope of its statutory mandate by amending the
fee schedule to charge a signatory fee.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the
moving party must demonstrate either (1) both
"probable success on the merits and the possibility
of irreparable harm," or (2) existence of "serious
questions regarding the merits and the balance of
hardships tips sharply in its favor." Cyrix Corp.
and Tiger Direct Inc. advertise that the XpressAUDIO system which utilizes the Media GX chip
is "Sound Blaster compatible." The Creative Labs'
Sound Blaster card is computer hardware that
produces audio effects. Under the Lanham Act.
For the plaintiff to prevail in a false advertising
claim, the following five elements must be shown:
(1) a false statement of fact by defendant in a
commercial advertisement about its own or another's product, (2) the statement actually
deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience, (3) the deception is
material, in that it is likely to influence the
purchasing decision, (4) the defendant caused its
false statement to enter interstate commerce, and
(5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured
as a result of the false statement, either by direct
diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a
lessening of the goodwill associated with its products.

Holding:

Creative Labs, Inc. v. Cyrix Corp.
42 U.S. P.Q.2d 1872 (N.D. Cal. 1997)

DiretTV, Inc. v. FCC
110 F.3d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

Issue:
Whether (1) to grant a preliminary injunction
against Cyrix Corporation from distribution of
Creative Labs' "applet" software based on allegations of copyright infringement, whether (2) to
grant a preliminary injunction against Cyrix Corp.
and Tiger Direct, Inc. from advertising that the
XpressAUDIO and systems utilizing XpressAUDIO are "Sound Blaster compatible," and (3)
to grant an ex parte application by Creative Labs
for an order to show cause re contempt.

Issue:
(1) Whether the auctioning of satellite channels reclaimed from former lessors of the channels ("permittees"), was: (a) impermissible as primarily retroactive, (b) secondarily retroactive, (c)
arbitrary and capricious in fact, (d) authorized by
statute and (2) whether it was arbitrary and capricious in not prohibiting the cable television industry from participating in the auction; and whether
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the divestiture rule accompanying such auction
was arbitrary and capricious.
Holding:
Such auctioning of reclaimed satellite channels
was not impermissible as primarily retroactive, any
secondary retroactivity was not determinative, the
decision to auction such channels was not arbitrary and capricious in fact, the FCC was authorized to adopt such an auction proceeding in distributing reclaimed channels, the petitioner's had
no standing to challenge the lack of prohibition
to the cable television industry's participation in
the auctions and the divestiture rule was not arbitrary and capricious.
Discussion:
Challenge was sought by current permittees as
to a change in the policy of the FCC, which had
abided by a preexisting policy of distributing reclaimed satellite channels pro rata to certain preexisting permittees. Instead, the FCC proceeded
to hold reclaimed channels up for competitive
bidding. This challenge was based on an alleged
retroactive effect of such a decision upon preexisting permittees.
The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that a
rule is retroactive only if it meets one of three
tests: (1) impairing rights a party possessed when
they acted, (2) increasing a party's liability for
past actions, and (3) imposing new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Landgraf
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). This
test was applied in this case with a finding that the
decision to auction off the reclaimed channels
was not retroactive. The FCC stated that the application of the rule is only to currently available
channels and channels available in the future,
therefore it does not make past behavior unlawful
or otherwise subject to a penalty.
Further, the petitioners claimed a secondary
retroactivity for the expectations they had relied
upon in purchasing and upgrading new satellites,
the purpose of which was to make space available
on their satellites for the reclaimed channels distributed in pro rata form. The court rejected this
argument stating that merely altering the current
state of affairs does not constitute an arbitrary and
capricious act which would be necessary for establishing such a secondary retroactivity, holding

that all the FCC needed was to provide a reasonable explanation for changing its policy for which
the FCC cited a better method of serving the public interest.
The court found that the new rule was not arbitrary and capricious because the FCC provided a
reasonable explanation for creating the new rule
based on the relevant factors and free of any clear
error. Though the FCC changed its policy, the
court found that this alone does not constitute arbitrary or capricious action, rather, it merely alters the current state of affairs.
The court rejected petitioner's claim that the
FCC had no authority to adopt the auction process based on existing precedent. Because the
court found that the FCC first cast aside the existing precedent as outmoded, it was free to adopt
a new methodology.
The court denied the standing of petitioners to
challenge the non-prohibition of participation by
the cable television industry in the auction on the
basis that there was no injury to petitioner.
Finally, the court addressed the merits of the
petitioners' claims regarding the arbitrary and capricious manner in which the FCC proceeded in
determining whether to allow or disallow the participation of the cable television industry in the
auction process and the divestiture rule. The
court found that the FCC did consider the effects
of such a decision and thought that the decision
was supported by the public's interests in fostering competition and fostering a potential third independent and competitive provider of direct
broadcasting satellite (DBS) service. Therefore,
the court held that the one-time divestiture rule
would achieve the goals of the FCC in that the
rule was reasonably aimed at promoting competition.

Freeman Engineering Assocs., Inc. v. FCC
103 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issues:
The court considered three primary issues: first,
whether a denial by the FCC of a "pioneer's preference" is comparable to the denial of a license
under 47 U.S.C. Section 402(b), thereby imposing
a 30 day time limitation for filing appeals of such
denials; second, whether the Commission may
properly deny preference based upon findings
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that "adaptations of technology" are not "innovative;" and finally, whether ex parte communication
to the Commission in the form of a report from a
competing applicant serves to invalidate a preference decision by the Commission.
Holding:

The court first held that the denial of a pioneer's preference is not the same as the denial of
a license, and therefore, is appealable under Section 402(a) rather than Section 402(b). Upon
finding proper jurisdiction, the court found that
as an administrative agency, the Commission may
reasonably interpret its own rules to mean that adaptations of technology are not innovative. The
court, however, found that such an interpretation
was not accorded equally among all of the applicants, and that such disparate treatment affected
the petitioner, QUALCOMM. Therefore, the decision to deny QUALCOMM's preference was remanded for remedial measures. Finally, the court
held that, based upon evidence in the record, any
ex parte communications that did take place did
not actually influence the decision-makers during
the application process.
Discussion:

Five petitioners appealed an FCC order denying "pioneer's preferences." The petitioners asserted that the decisions of the Commission were
arbitrary and capricious, and were influenced by
improper ex parte communications. The Commission contended that the court lacked jurisdiction
to hear the claims as a result of untimely filings of
the petitions.
The court held that the claim was properly
before it because the petition was filed within the
time specified under 47 U.S.C. Section 402(a). In
making that finding, the court held that a denial
by the Commission of a pioneer's preference is
neither a denial of a license, nor is it ancillary to
the denial of a license (which would have made
the claim appealable under section 402(b) instead, with a shorter time period for filing a petition).
Each petitioner asserted that the Commission's
denial was arbitrary and capricious, and thus, in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The court found merit in only one party's claim.
This claim was asserted by QUALCOMM. The
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Commission denied QUALCOMM's application
based upon the fact that it lacked innovativeness,
because it was "merely an adaptation" which was
not developed specifically for the advancement of
a particularservice. QUALCOMM argued that such
a requirement had never been in place before,
only that the technology improve some service,
rather than merely contribute to research. The
court did not agree with QUALCOMM in this instance and accorded deference to the agency's interpretation of its own rules. However, the court
did agree that even though the Commission may
adopt new interpretations of its own rules, it must
do so uniformly. The court found that, to the detriment of QUALCOMM, the new interpretation
was not applied equally to all preference applicants. As a result, the Commission's decision to
deny QUALCOMM's preference was vacated, and
remanded for further proceedings to remedy the
inconsistency.
The second petitioner, AMT/DSST, made the
following arguments. First, petitioner contended
that the Commission deviated from its own announced criteria by basing its denial on the
ground that the technology had not been field
tested. The court found that: (1) the Commission
based its decision on the fact that technical feasibility had not been demonstrated, and (2) petitioners had ample opportunity to refute that
claim.
Second, AMT/DSST claimed that the Commission disparately granted pioneer's preferences
with equally incompatible proposals. However,
the court found that petitioner's system was a "different type of system altogether," and therefore
could not be compared to the other proposals.
The three other petitioners, Viacom, Freeman
and ACT, raised issues of innovation and technical feasibility. However, those issues were not addressed, as a result of the petitioners' failure to
present their claims properly before the court.
Two parties, QUALCOMM and ACT, complained that the Commission relied upon improper ex parte communications throughout the
process. Specifically, QUALCOMM asserted that
the Commission relied upon a report prepared by
a competing applicant, which was not served
upon the parties. The court agreed that the communication had the potential to improperly taint
the decision-making process. However, because
the Commission actually came to a finding that
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was the opposite of that proposed in the report,
the court found that the communication was
harmless. With respect to ACT's claim, the court
found that, because ACT failed to first raise the
issue before the Commission administratively, it
did not have the authority to consider the claim.
Graceba Total Communications, Inc. v.

FCC

and statutory challenges to administrative rules to
thirty days would deny many parties relief due to
the continuing effects of administrative rules, 47
U.S.C. Section 405 does not operate as a complete
bar to reconsiderations after a thirty day period,
and Graceba's constitutional challenge was an authorized supplement to its earlier timely petition.
The court found Graceba's first petition without
merit and remanded its constitutional claim.

115 F.3d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether the FCC erred in determining that
Graceba Total Communications' ("Graceba") petition for reconsideration, which claimed the
FCC's practice of providing a 25% bidding credit
to minority and/or women-owned businesses participating in interactive video data services (IVDS)
auctions were unconstitutional was untimely.
Holding:
Finding that the Commission has a duty to address constitutional claims which do not challenge Congressionally mandated FCC actions, the
court remanded Graceba's claim to the Commission for further consideration.
Discussion:
Upon winning two IVDS licenses in a 1994 FCC
auction, Graceba, which is not minority or women-owned, claimed the Commission's 25% bidding credit, afforded to minority and womenowned businesses, artificially inflated the price of
licenses. While Graceba's claim was pending, the
Supreme Court held that all government racial
classifications are constitutional only if "they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests." Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Accordingly,
Graceba submitted an emergency petition to the
FCC challenging the bidding credit rule's constitutionality and asked the Commission to consider
the petition in conjunction with Graceba's earlier
filed, still pending claim.
The Commission denied Graceba's constitutional challenge, finding the petition was filed after thirty days from the FCC's adoption of the bidding credit rule, therefore, it was barred by 47
U.S.C. Section 405. The court rejected the FCC's
reasoning, and held that: limiting constitutional

Illinois Public Telecommunications Ass'n
v. FCC
117 F.3d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:

Whether the FCC's new payphone regulations,
pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
were implemented: (1) without the authority to
regulate or deregulate the States from regulating
rates for local coin calls; (2) arbitrarily and capriciously insofar as they (a) used the rate for local
coin calls in the majority of the States that have
deregulated their local coin call rates as the basis
for determining the interim compensation for access code and subscriber 800 calls; (b) excused inter-exchange carriers ("IXCs") with toll revenues
of less than $100 million from compensating
payphone service providers ("PSPs") for such calls
during the first year of the interim compensation
period; (c) adopted the local coin call rate that a
PSP sets at each payphone as the default rate of
permanent compensation for access code and
subscriber 800 calls made from that phone, (d)
excluded inmate and other 0+ calls from the interim compensation plan, (e) required carriers,
not callers, to pay PSPs for access code and subscriber 800 calls, (f) were implemented without
adequate notice of an adoption of a market-based
interim compensation scheme, (g) did not take
into account the possibility of "locational monopolies"; and (h) required the use of a methodology
for valuing payphone assets transferred from regulated to unregulated status which did not adequately protect the interests of ratepayers.
Holding:
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held
that: (1) the Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorized the FCC to set local coin rates for
payphones; (2) the decision to deregulate local
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coin rates for payphones was not arbitrary and capricious for failing to address the possibility of "locational monopolies"; (3) the FCC could set local
coin rates according to market forces; (4) the decision to set compensation rate for toll-free and
access code calls as equal to deregulated local
coin rate was arbitrary and capricious; (5) the interim compensations plan was arbitrary and capricious; (6) the "carrier pays" compensation
scheme for toll-free telephone calls was valid; (7)
the FCC would require IXCs to "track" calls from
payphones; (8) the FCC was not required to prohibit all discrimination by particular telecommunications operating companies that provided
payphone service in favor of their own payphone
services; and (9) the FCC's method of payphone
asset valuation was invalid as to portion of method
based on fair market value.
Discussion:
The court concluded that Congress explicitly
and unambiguously granted the FCC the authority to set local coin call rates in order to achieve
"fair compensation" to payphone operators. The
petitioners advanced an alternative that the new
regulations failed to take into account the existence of "locational monopolies," whereby failing
to ensure that payphone rates would not be inflated from such an area, the court concluded
that the FCC did not fail to consider this, but it
merely decided to address such issues as they
arose and reserved the right to modify the scheme
in the future. The court also found that a marketbased scheme was just as reasonable as a rate-setting schemes both are compensation based. The
court concluded that, on the issue of setting the
access and 800 call rates equal to that of deregulated coin call rates, the evidence strongly was in
opposition to the FCC's position that the costs of
local coin calls is similar to 800 and access code
calls and therefore the court found the FCC's decision to set the rates as equivalent was arbitrary
and capricious.
With regard to the interim compensation
scheme, the court found that the base rate assigned to valuating the compensation under the
interim plan was based on the same logic as was
the FCC's position on setting the local coin calls
equal to that of 800 and access code calls, therefore the court found no basis for upholding the
interim plan. Further, the court pointed out that

the required payments from only large IXCs was
unjustified. As for the 0+ dialing and inmate calling, the FCC failed to justify in any means why
they left out 0+ dialing and inmate calling from
their 800 and access code calling scheme and is
therefore inconsistent with the requirement that
"fair compensation" be provided for "each and
every ...

call," and is arbitrary and capricious.

The concept of "carrier pays" was upheld by the
court on the basis that the carriers can accept or
refuse to do business with a PSP that sets excessively high rates and that the public interest supports such a system of coinless calling. The FCC
found that the carrier was the "primary economic
beneficiary" with regard to such calls and therefore, it is in the best position to bear the burden
of the system. The "tracking" issue also was upheld in that the court found valid the FCC's determination that the IXCs already have the technology to track their calls and therefore can do so at
a lower cost than other parties.
The court upheld the issue of non-discrimination in the FCC's decision to prohibit all discrimination by telecommunications operating companies in only basic services on grounds that the
FCC's decision was based on a permissible construction of the statute because there was no unambiguous congressional intent with regards to
nontariffed services. Finally, the issue regarding
the method of valuating payphone assets was
found to be arbitrary and capricious as it failed to
adequately balance the interests of the companies, their shareholders and ratepayers.
Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC
120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether the FCC pricing guidelines for local
intrastate telecommunications service exceeded
the scope of the FCC's jurisdiction and also violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the
"Act").
Holding:
The FCC exceeded its jurisdiction by promulgating guidelines for purely intrastate telecommunications services. Further, the "pick and choose"
method for price determination violates the procompetition intent of the Act which was designed
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to allow local telephone companies to "privately
negotiate" agreements.
Discussion:
Under the Act, incumbent local exchange carriers ("incumbent LECs") must allow new local exchange carriers ("entrant LECs") to compete in
their markets. The FCC issued a release (the First
Report and Order), which addressed the prices that
the incumbent LECs could charge entrant LECs
for "interconnection, unbundled access, and resale, as well as on the rules regarding the prices
for the transport and termination of local telecommunications traffic." Various incumbent
LECs and state utility commissions, (the petitioners), filed this suit to challenge the FirstReport and
Order and the underlying FCC rules.
The Act specifically granted state utility commissions jurisdiction over local intrastate price determinations. The FCC may have jurisdiction
over intrastate telecommunications when they are
connected to larger interstate regulation, however, in this case, the local intrastate price negotiations can be separated from larger interstate regulation. The FCC may clearly leave to the state
regulators the issue of intrastate prices for these
services. Thus, the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction
by exercising authority in this area. The court
concluded that the First Report and Order should
not be vacated in whole, but rather, certain FCC
rules that specifically address the prices that an incumbent LEC may charge an entrant LEC should
be overturned.
Under the Act, incumbent LECs must allow entrant LECs to receive the "same terms and conditions" provided in any agreement between the incumbent LEC and another carrier. The FCC
interpretation of a statute must prevail unless it is
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute
or an unreasonable construction of an ambiguous
statute. The FCC interprets this provision to allow
the entrant to "pick and choose" provisions from
various agreements without accepting all of the
terms and conditions in a single agreement. The
court concluded that this interpretation was unreasonable as it placed an undue burden on the
incumbent LECs and contravened the intention
of the Act to promote competition through private price negotiations.

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc.
65 U.S.L.W. 2774, 43 U.S.P.Q. 1056 (C.D.
Cal. 1997)
Issue:
Whether there are issues of fact to be determined by a fact finder that would allow plaintiff to
recover, pursuant to defendant's motion to partially dismiss plaintiffs claims and related relief.
Holding:
Motion dismissed, as there were issues of fact to
be determined by the fact finder.
Discussion:
Plaintiff Lockheed Martin Corporation claimed
trademark infringement of an Internet domain
name registered by defendant. The issue to be
decided was whether the use of such a domain
name infringed upon or diluted the plaintiffs
mark. The court found that all of the facts in the
non-movant's best interest would not preclude
judgment and therefore denied the motion to
partially dismiss. The court further denied a
counterclaim that the plaintiff failed to join all indispensable parties in the action. Because the
court found that the action in tort applied the
theory of joint and several liability, and it determined that the Rule 19b inquiry need not be undertaken.
Mobiletel, Inc. v. FCC
107 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether the FCC was correct in dismissing
Mobiletel, Inc.'s application to provide cellular
service to two Rural Service Areas in Louisiana.
Holding:
The FCC dismissal was affirmed.
Discussion:
In affirming the FCC's dismissal, the court con-
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sidered and rejected four arguments advanced by
petitioner. First, in concluding that the FCC's interpretation of the word "landline" in Section
22.902(b) of its rules was not plainly wrong, the
court noted that the Commission's construction
of the term was "reasonable and consistent" with
many of its relevant policies.
In its reasoning, the court included the fact that
the "wireline set-aside" was designed to assist
smaller telephone companies in local markets
that run the risk of being squeezed out by larger
competitors and the Commission's wish to minimize the number of companies competing for the
Rural Service Areas. Second, the court accepted
these same policy justifications when it concluded
that the petitioner was not entitled to a waiver of
eligibility. Third, although petitioner asserted
that the regulation "as written" and the Commission's previous interpretations thereof gave petitioner the reasonable impression that the setaside covered all parties who provided local telephone service in the area by either wires or alternative technology, the court found that a "good
faith prospective applicant" for these frequencies
who had given Section 22.902(b) a fair reading
would not have reached this conclusion. Finally,
the court rejected the petitioner's arbitrary and
capricious argument by finding that, while petitioner had entered into a settlement agreement
with Columbia, an eligible entity, this did not
change or alter the fact that petitioner was still ineligible for the Block B frequencies for which it
had applied.
People of the State of California v. FCC
_

F.3d

_,

1997 WL 476529 (8th Cir. 1997)

Issue:
Whether (1) the FCC's dialing parity rules exceeded its jurisdiction because they regulate intrastate telecommunications services, and (2) the
FCC rules on numbering administration violate
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act").
Holding:
The dialing parity rules exceed the FCC's jurisdiction and, consequently, must be vacated. The
issue of the FCC numbering administration is not
"ripe for review."
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Discussion:
Under the Act, incumbent local exchange carriers ("incumbent LECs") must allow new local
exchange carriers ("entrant LECs") to compete in
their markets. The FCC issued a release (the Second Report and Order) which addressed, among
other things, the requirement that "all local exchange carriers provide dialing parity to competing providers." Dialing parity "enables a telephone customer to route a call over the network
of customer pre-selected carriers without having
to dial an access code of extra digits." Various incumbent LECs and the California Public Utilities
Commission (the petitioners), filed this suit to
challenge the Second Report and Order and the underlying FCC rules. The petitioners allege that
the FCC regulations concerning intrastate communications between several "local access and
transport areas" ("LATAs") exceed the scope of
the FCC's jurisdiction.
The Act specifically reserved to state utility commissions jurisdiction over local intrastate price determinations. The FCC may have jurisdiction
over intrastate telecommunications when they are
connected to larger interstate regulation, but in
the current case, the local intrastate dialing parity
can be separated from larger interstate regulation. Even communications between several
LATAs (referred to as "interLATA" communications) may occur entirely within one state. Thus,
the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction by exercising
authority in this area. This decision follows the
court's decision in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120
F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), which vacated FCC rules
that were articulated in the First Report and Order
that addressed the prices that the incumbent
LECs could charge entrant LECs for "interconnection, unbundled access, and resale, as well as
on the rules regarding the prices for the transport
and termination of local telecommunications traffic." Likewise, the court now concludes that the
FCC exceeded its authority in adopting dialing
parity rules governing intrastate communications.
PSWF Corporation v. FCC
108 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
American Mobilphone, Inc. (now PSWF Corpo-
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ration) filed a petition for review after the FCC
refused to reconsider its order establishing a new
category of 929 MHz private carrier paging
licenses.

that they are available to anyone under 18 years
old, pursuant 47 U.S.C. Section 223(d), violates
the First Amendment.
Holding:

Holding:
The court, in rejecting petitioner's arguments,
held that: (1) the Commission's order was not
misleading so as to make American Mobilphone
believe that the new rules concerning slow-growth
eligibility which applied to new applicants were
also applicable to grandfathered applicants, of
which American was one, and (2) the Commission's choice of the Sunshine Notice date as the
cut-off for slow-growth eligibility was not arbitrary
and capricious.
Discussion:
In reaching its decision, the court noted that
"agencies may change their minds in the course
of a rulemaking even though those affected may
be disappointed." After setting this tone, the
court analyzed American's two arguments. The
court responded to American's first argument regarding the misleading effect of the order by stating that "American could not possibly have taken
the order to mean what it claims." The court
looked at the language of the Order and found
nothing misleading in it. To the contrary, the
court found clearly set out rules to which American could adhere. The court responded to American's second argument, that the cut-off for slowgrowth eligibility was arbitrary and capricious, by
labeling the Commission's choice of that specific
date a "policy decision" and by noting that there
was no legal basis for concluding that some other
may have been preferable.
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997)
Issue:
Whether the Communications Decency Act of
1996's ("CDA") prohibition against: (1) the
knowing transmission of obscene or indecent
messages on the Internet to anyone under 18
years old, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 223(a)
and, (2) criminalization of knowingly sending
messages which depict or describe sexual or excretory activities in a patently offensive manner so

The "indecent transmission" provision in Section 223(a) and the "patently offensive" provision
of Section 223(d) are violative of the First Amendment's protection against the abridgment of freedom of speech. Because obscene speech is not
protected, however, the Court severed the term
"or indecent" from Section 223(a), and left the
rest of the sentence intact.
Discussion:
The Court found that precedent did not require it to uphold the CDA because the CDA differed from other challenged, but upheld, laws in
that it did not provide for parental consent; it was
not limited to commercial transactions; it lacked a
definition of indecent and; it did not require patently offensive material to lack socially redeeming value. Further, the Court refused to apply
broadcast precedent because the Internet, relative
to broadcast, is not a limited medium and it is not
invasive.
The Court also found the CDA's vagueness
would have a chilling effect on free speech. Specifically, because the CDA does not define "indecent" or "patently offensive," speakers cannot be
certain what the terms mean and what is prohibited.
Because the CDA is a content based regulation,
it must survive strict scrutiny. Although the Government has a compelling interest in protecting
minors, the CDA is not narrowly tailored. The
CDA places a huge burden on adult speech by attempting to restrict speech from reaching minors.
The Court has previously established that indecent, but not obscene, sexual expression is protected by the First Amendment and discourse cannot be limited to that which is only suitable for
minors.
The Court rejected the Government's argument that the CDA was narrowly tailored because
it provided a defense for transmitters who took actions to restrict minors' access to their messages.
Requiring users to provide a credit card number
or password does not provide certainty that the
user is an adult.
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The Court did allow Section 223(a)'s prohibition on transmitting obscene messages to stand
because there is no First Amendment protection
for obscenity.

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC
116 F.3d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether local exchange carriers ("LECs") violated FCC rules when they assessed resellers two
terminating carrier common line ("CCL")
charges, rather than one terminating charge and
one originating charge for a single call placed
through the resellers' 800 services.
Holding:
The LECs violated FCC rules and were liable to
resellers for partial refunds. There exists no danger for excessive recovery because LECs' direct
customers could not recover higher CCL charges
than they were assessed.
Discussion:
A group of local exchange carriers were joined
in these consolidated petitions alleging violation
of the FCC's rules by assessing certain inter-exchange carriers ("IXCs") of 800 services excessive
carrier common line charges. The costs sought
were for services and facilities used to originate
and terminate interstate long-distance calls.
LECs following the FCC's rules were to assess a
lower CCL charge for originating a call and a
higher CCL charge for terminating an interstate
long-distance call. While the price difference has
diminished over time, such numbers were significant at the time of this action. The CCL charges
at issue are assessed in terms of the "open end" of
a call (i.e., any end that uses the carrier common
line plant of a LEC).
A problem arose as a result of interstate longdistance calls having two "open ends." The FCC
found that the LECs were assessing a higher fee at
both ends against the IXCs. The FCC found that
as a result of this overcharging, the LECs were required to calculate and refund any overcharges to
those IXCs affected .
In addition, the IXCs alleged that LECs violated
the FCC's ReadyLine Clarification Order because
the LECs assessed the IXCs at a higher terminat-
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ing CCL charge when the originating segment
used an 800 line. The LECs located at the terminating end of the call would directly assess the reseller the higher CCL charge because the call terminated at an open end. The Common Carrier
Bureau found that a call made through the 800
service of the IXCs before them is a single end to
end call and should not be assessed the higher
CCL charge at both ends.
In the end, however, the only question at issue
was whether the complainants were entitled to receive a refund for the overcharges. Since there
was no means through which the petitioners
could recover money properly assessed through
800 calls and the only refunds available were
those excessive charges by the LECS, the Commission found no means through which double recovery could occur.
Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC
105 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Whether the D.C. Circuit, in banc, should rehear the panel's prior decision in Time Warner v.
FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 973-77 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and ultimately, whether the principles in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), should be extended to direct broadcast satellite ("DBS"),
thereby relaxing First Amendment protections for
that medium.
Holding:
The suggested rehearing in banc was denied by
a majority of court, and a dissent filed by Judge
Williams, with whom Judges Edwards, Silberman,
Ginsburg, and Sentelle concurred. The effect of
the holding was an affirmance of the previous
panel decision that DBS should be treated similarly to broadcasting, rather than cable, and therefore, should be afforded relaxed First Amendment protection.
Discussion:
The dissenting opinion explained that DBS
should not be treated similarly to broadcasting because it is not "scarce" in its resources. The dissent focused upon the issue of scarcity, noting
that DBS currently offers even more channel capacity than offered by the cable industry. In disa-
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greement with the majority, the dissent also suggested that the regulation is a content-based
regulation because of its requirement that a portion of the channels be allocated for educational
programming, thereby calling for strict scrutiny
review.
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC
117 S.Ct. 1174 (1997)
Issue:
Whether the record supports Congress' judgment that the must-carry provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act, requiring carriage of local broadcast television stations on cable television systems, further
governmental interests and whether the provisions impermissibly burden more speech than
necessary to further those interests.
Holding:
The Supreme Court held that first, the interests
advanced by Congress were important government interests for First Amendment purposes;
second, for purposes of determining if must-carry
provisions of the Act were designed to address
real harm under First Amendment analysis, substantial evidence supported Congress' conclusions
that significant numbers of broadcast stations
would be refused carriage on cable systems absent
must-carry requirements and that local stations
dropped by or denied carriage on cable systems
would be at serious risk of financial difficulty and
would deteriorate or fail; and third, the mustcarry provisions served government interests in a
direct and effective way and did not burden more
speech than necessary to further those interests.

firmed that each of these is an important government interest.
The Court next turned to the questions of
whether the must-carry provisions were designed
to address a real harm and whether the provisions
will effectively abate that harm in a material way.
In analyzing the harm that induced Congressional
action, the Court noted that "substantial deference" must be afforded to the "prescriptive judgments" of Congress. After reviewing the evidence
presented before Congress, the Court found that
there was a substantial basis for Congress' conclusion that there existed a real threat in terms of the
significant numbers of broadcast stations that
would be refused carriage on cable systems and
the serious risk of financial difficulty and failure
that many local broadcast stations would face if
the must-carry provisions were not enacted.
In analyzing the effectiveness of the provisions
to ameliorate this harm, the Court found that,
"[m]ust-carry

ensures that a number of local

broadcasters retain cable carriage, with the concomitant audience access and advertising revenues needed to support a multiplicity of stations,"
and thus, the provisions serve the aforementioned
government interests in a "direct and effective
way." The Court also recognized that the provisions have the potential to interfere with protected speech, but subsequently held that this burden is congruent to the benefits posited by mustcarry and, thus, are narrowly-tailored. Further,
the Court held that the appellants advanced no
adequate alternatives to must-carry for promoting
legitimate government interests.
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States
107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997)
Issue:

Discussion:
The Supreme Court reasoned that for a content-neutral regulation to be found valid on First
Amendment grounds, it must advance important
government interests. The Court next delineated
the three interests that the must-carry provisions
were designed to serve: "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television;
(2) promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources; and
(3). promoting fair competition in the market for
television programming." Finally, the Court reaf-

Whether federal regulations which criminalize
the broadcast of advertisements for casino gambling violates the First Amendment.
Holding:
The court declared the statute and accompanying FCC regulation, which prohibited advertisements for casino gambling, were unconstitutional,
and werean infringement on broadcaster's First
Amendment Rights. In making its decision, the
court found that the government's interests were,
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in fact, substantial. Because the statute and regulation had numerous exceptions to the prohibition, however, they did not directly advance those
substantial interests.
Discussion:
Valley Broadcasting Company and Sierra
Braodcasting Company ("the Broadcasters") are
Nevada corporations which own and operate television stations in Nevada. Although the majority
of their audience is located in Nevada, a substantial minority of the households which receive the
Broadcasters' signals reside outside the state of
Nevada. The Broadcasters sought to broadcast
advertisements for casino gambling, a legal activity in the State of Nevada. The Broadcasters, however, declined to accept such advertising for fear
of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Section 1304 and
its implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. Section
73.1211, which prohibit the broadcasting of advertisements for casino gambling.
The Broadcasters brought an action against the
FCC seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Specifically, the Broadcasters claimed that the
statute and regulation were in contravention to
the First Amendment, as unconstitutional limitations on commercial speech.'
The primary issue was whether the regulations
which prevented advertising, unconstitutionally
limited commercial speech. The court applied a
four-part test, adopted from CentralHudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, for determining
whether the statute and regulation unconstitutionally prohibited protected speech. 447 U.S.
557, 561-62 (1980). The test involves the basic
heightened scrutiny analysis utilized for reviewing
government action which limits commercial
speech. First, the court must ascertain whether
the speech is protected by the First Amendment.
In order to fall within such protection, the speech
must, at a minimum, concern "lawful activity and
not be misleading." Second, the court determines
whether the governmental interest is substantial.
Third, if the speech is constitutionally protected
expression, and if the governmental interest is
substantial, then the court then analyzes whether
I Note that because the Broadcasters were not facing
criminal prosecution at the time of the initiation of the suit,
they first had to overcome a challenge for lack of standing.
In order to establish standing to sue, they had to show "a
reasonable threat of prosecution for conduct allegedly pro-
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"the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted." Finally, the regulation must
not be more extensive than is necessary to accomplish the government's interest.
The court found that the first prong was satisfied as a result of the parties' agreement that the
advertising in question was neither illegal nor misleading. Therefore, the speech was deemed protected as "commercial speech." At issue were the
remaining three prongs.
In order to satisfy the second prong, the government asserted two interests to be advanced by
the regulation. First, the government has an interest in reducing public participation in commercial lotteries in order to protect public health,
welfare and safety. The government has an additional interest in protecting states who choose to
prohibit gambling. The court determined that
both of the asserted government interests were
substantial, and therefore, the second prong of
the test was satisfied.
With respect to the government's first asserted
interest, the court found that there was evidence
that there exists a link between casino gambling
and organized crime. Regarding the second interest, the court explained that non-casino states
would have no effective means for protecting
their residents from spillover advertising without
a federal ban. The court further noted that the
protection of non-lottery states at the expense of
lottery states was not unconstitutional. Therefore,
the court found the government's second interest, in assisting states which choose to prohibit casino gambling, to be substantial and constitutionally proper.
The analysis broke down at the third prong.
Based in part upon the Supreme Court's recent
decision of Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the court
found that the statute and regulation did not directly advance the government's interest. 514
U.S. 476 (1995). Similar to the statute in this
case, the statute in question in Rubin granted numerous exceptions to the rule, which served to
undermine its overall effectiveness. Consequently, the court found that the statute and regulation failed the third prong of test set forth in
tected by the Constitution." Because the FCC had historically found violations for advertisements similar to those

sought to be broadcast by the Broadcasters, the court found
that the broadcasters did, in fact, have standing.
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Central Hudson.2 The court accordingly struck
down the statute and regulations as an unconstitutional infringement of broadcaster's rights.
2
Having concluded that the third prong was not satisfled, the court did not reach a decision as to whether the

statute was "more extensive than necessary."
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